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Naive applications of decision theory often assume that it works by
taking a specification of probabilities and utilities and using them to
calculate the expected utilities of various acts, with a rational agent be-
ing required to take whichever act has the highest (or sufficiently high)
expected utility. However, justifications of the formal framework of ex-
pected utility theory generally work in the opposite way — they start
with an agent’s preferences among acts, and use them to calculate an
implied probability and utility function. The theory of expected utility
is justified by showing that any agent who satisfies some reasonable-
seeming constraints on her preferences can be represented in such a
way, by postulating appropriate abstract “probability” and “utility”
functions.
In section 1 I give some reasons why the view based on represen-
tation theorems is unsatisfying, and why some other potential justifi-
cations of expected utility theory won’t work. In section 2 I describe
an alternate way to build decision theory that is more in agreement
with the naive view, taking probability and utility to define norms on
preference. I show how to prove that the resulting set of preferences is
consistent, without just taking that as a brute requirement, as in repre-
sentation theorems. In section 3 I then develop a version of this theory
beginning with a very restricted dominance principle and extending it
by means of some indifference relations. I show that with some natural
assumptions, the resulting theory generates all of the preferences aris-
ing from classical expected utility theory, and more. I will give some
minor support for the resulting theory, but I will also show how ver-
sions can be developed that use different assumptions. This allows the
modular development of decision theory, so that responding to a prob-
lem case doesn’t require starting over from scratch. I don’t claim to
have a sufficient argument for rejecting the orthodox view, but I hope
to demonstrate that there are several advantages of this alternative
view.
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1. Traditional Theory
1.1 Representation Theorems
The orthodox view of decision theory endorsed by Savage (1954) and
Jeffrey (1965) takes preference over acts with uncertain outcomes to be
the fundamental concept of decision theory, and shows that if these
preferences satisfy a particular set of axioms, then they can be repre-
sented by a probability function and a utility function. This “represen-
tation theorem” involves showing that the expected utilities calculated
from the probability and utility function correspond to the preferences
that the agent actually has. Importantly, on standard interpretations of
these results, the probabilities and utilities are not themselves funda-
mentally real, but are mere mathematical constructs out of the prefer-
ences.
This conflicts with a naive reading of the concept of expected utility,
which was perhaps the dominant understanding of theories that were
popular in the 17th to 19th centuries. One often assumes that utilities
and probabilities are prior to preference, and that decision theory says
that you should prefer an act with a higher expected utility over any act
with a lower expected utility. And this is how the theory of expected
utility is often applied in practical contexts. However, according to the
orthodox theory, there is no normative requirement, but rather a con-
ceptual necessity! What it is to have probabilities and utilities just is to
have preferences that line up with the resulting expected utilities. If an
actual agent’s preferences don’t line up with the calculations, then the
preferences and utilities one is calculating with just aren’t those of the
agent. (A similar point is made by Meacham and Weisberg (2011).)
A natural thought is that one might step back from taking on the
full set of axioms as a normative theory for agents. Rather, one might al-
low that actual agents fall short of full rationality. Perhaps some further
sort of representation might still be applied to calculate probabilities
and utilities that provide a good (though not perfect) representation of
the agent’s preferences. If this can be done, then calculating expected
utilities according to these probabilities and utilities might be able to
provide some normative guidance for an agent to fix her other pref-
erences so that they better approach ideal rationality. But it’s far from
obvious that it will be possible to divide the agent’s preferences in this
way, so that a subset is sufficient to define the probabilities and utilities,
and even if this can be done, it’s not obvious why these probabilities
and utilities should be normative on the others, rather than vice versa.
Regardless of the prospects for this sort of roundabout use of the
representation theorems, there have been many challenges to the ax-
ioms on preference that are required for the theory to get off the
ground. A particular interpretation of McGee (1999) shows that these
assumptions (or, at least, slightly generalized versions of them) mean
that utilities cannot be unbounded if there are arbitrarily small posi-
tive probabilities. Thus, potential paradoxes like St. Petersburg, Two
Envelope, and Pasadena (Nover and Hájek, 2004) just can’t arise. But
as Nover and Hájek argue, the theory gives no reason for any particu-
lar value to be an upper bound on utility — it just requires that some
ad hoc bound exist to block the paradoxes. Traditional expected utility
theory allows these cases to arise, though it doesn’t say what agents
should prefer (Fine, 2008). However, representation theorems just rule
them out of consideration entirely, because they violate conditions of
continuity and the like. I intend to give a theory that can allow for
them and also give some guidance on what to prefer, though my the-
ory won’t settle all questions involving them.
Another problem for this use of representation theorems is the
source of the normativity involved. On the standard representation
theorems, it appears that the norms on belief arise out of the role of
belief in governing action. However, many philosophers have argued
that the fundamental norms on belief must arise out of the aim of
seeking the truth (Shah, 2003; Wedgwood, 2002). Although it has been
argued that decision-theoretic justifications of probabilism may not be
essentially pragmatic, and may use preferences just as an example of
a mental attitude in which non-probabilistic agents must be inconsis-
tent (Christensen, 1996), it’s still hard to see how an inconsistency of
preferences connects to the fundamental aim of closeness to the truth.
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Joyce (1998) uses a notion of “accuracy”, or closeness to the truth,
to give an argument for probabilism in one’s degrees of belief, but
gives no connection between this probability function and one’s ac-
tions. Representation theorems give no indication that the probabil-
ity function constructed out of preference must correspond to one’s
degrees of belief. (This is the assumption called “Representation Ac-
curacy” criticized by Meacham and Weisberg (2011, p. 655).) Instead,
one would like to start with Joyce’s totally non-pragmatic probabil-
ity function, and use it to generate a norm of preferring acts on the
basis of their expected utility, which can then explain why one’s pref-
erences ought to satisfy the axioms of a representation theorem. This
is especially important for “expected accuracy” arguments (exempli-
fied by Greaves and Wallace (2006), Easwaran (2013), and Leitgeb and
Pettigrew (2010)), which rely on Joyce’s foundations, and then seek to
evaluate “epistemic acts” by means of expected accuracy. For these ar-
guments, a justification of expected value calculations is central to the
purely epistemic program, and not just (as for Joyce) a connection be-
tween it and a theory of pragmatic value. One goal of this paper is to
show that these arguments can be carried out while taking accuracy
and degree of belief to both be prior to expected value.
Furthermore, there are paradoxes like those of Allais, Ellsberg, and
the like to which expected utility theory can’t give the intuitively cor-
rect answers. If these intuitive answers are correct, then the axioms in-
volved in the representation theorems can’t be. There have been some
theories (Buchak, 2013) that give representation theorems for decision
theories yielding the intuitive preferences in some of these cases, but
they involve reconstructing the decision theory from the axioms of pref-
erence up. In constructing my theory, I will show how various alterna-
tive choices along the way can at least accommodate the unorthodox
preferences, and I will hint at extensions of my theory that may even
be able to generate these preferences. (Ellsberg is discussed to some
extent in section 3.3.2, while Allais is dealt with more thoroughly in
section 3.5.5.) I will not aim to fully justify one alternative or another,
but hopefully this will show how the theory can be modified without
starting over from the beginning.
1.2 Laws of Large Numbers
An alternative justification of expected utility theory that takes prob-
ability and utility as fundamental is sometimes given in terms of the
laws of large numbers. These are theorems of probability theory that
show that for a long enough sequence of independent acts, the sum of
their actual utilities is very likely to be extremely close to the sum of
the expected utilities. Thus, if one makes a series of choices of lower
expected utility, then one will very likely end up in a worse situation
than if one had made a series of choices of higher expected utility. This
long-run behavior is supposed to then justify each individual choice.
(For an example of an argument using the weak law of large numbers
rather than the strong law of large numbers, see Easwaran (2008).)
However, this justification is not very often endorsed by philoso-
phers, because of some major problems. First, there is the obvious
problem that it seeks to justify each individual choice on the basis
that it is part of a sequence of choices that is good overall. While it is
plausible that a sequence of choices that are individually good must
itself be a good sequence of choices, there is no reason to suppose that
the converse holds — a sequence of choices that is overall good may
contain some individual choices that are themselves bad. Rule utili-
tarianism and Kantian ethics make parallel arguments — individual
acts are said to be good if they are part of an overall rule or policy or
maxim that is a good one. But this is a conceptual problem they all
share, and many criticisms of these views focus on the odd recommen-
dations they give in individual cases — most philosophers find at least
some of these recommendations to be bad, and take this as a reductio
of the theory, rather than accepting the principle that an individual act
is good if it is part of a sequence that is good.
Second, the laws of large numbers tell us about the limiting behav-
ior of infinitely long sequences of choices, but don’t necessarily give
guidance about how things turn out when only finitely many choices
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are actually made. If an act has positive probability both of gaining
and of losing utility for the agent, then the same will be true for any
large finite sum of independent copies of this act. One can’t get cer-
tainty out of finitely many independent copies of uncertain choices.
And although the repeated sequence of copies of the act with high-
est expected utility will have the highest probability of giving rise to
the best overall outcome, the repeated sequence of copies of the act
with the individual best possible outcome will itself have the individ-
ual best possible outcome, and the repeated sequence of copies of the
act that minimizes potential loss will itself minimize the potential loss.
Some principle is still needed to say why high probability of a good
outcome is better than a possibility of the best possible outcome, or
than guaranteeing avoidance of the worst possible outcome.
One can’t merely appeal to a principle that says that one should
prefer one series of acts to another if it is sufficiently likely that the
first gives a better result than the second, because this principle actu-
ally contradicts expected utility in cases where a gamble is extremely
likely to yield a minorly good outcome but has a small chance of giv-
ing an extremely bad one. One seems to need a principle that weighs
the probability of the bad outcome and the relative magnitudes of the
goodness or badness of other outcomes, which appears to be tanta-
mount to assuming the expected utility principle itself.
This second worry is most pressing when a choice is essentially non-
repeatable, and when one knows that there are only a limited number
of further decisions that one will make in one’s life. But it applies even
when the sequence is large but known not to be infinite. One can’t get
certainty out of the law of large numbers, as long as the large numbers
are finite. Without certainty, we are back where we started at trying
to evaluate a sequence of acts whose outcome could be either good or
bad, but with the additional problem of trying to connect our decision
about the sequence of acts to the decision about the single act.
1.3 The Goal of Decision Theory
Expected utility theory aims to evaluate acts by assigning a real num-
ber, known as the “expected utility”, to each one. However, at least
some of the cases that motivate alternatives to representation theorems
involve acts that could have infinite value. Furthermore, there are some
situations in which it appears to be impossible to represent ordinal
preferences correctly with just the real numbers.1 It’s conceivable that
there might be some numerical valuation that uses a set of numbers
far larger than the standard real numbers, like Abraham Robinson’s
“hyperreals”, or John Conway’s “surreals”. But I think this numerical
representation is inessential.
Instead, I will just aim to provide an ordering that represents the
normative preferences for a set of acts. If probabilities and utilities are
well-defined, then they will play a role in determining these norms.
1. For instance, consider the following example:
One is entering heaven, and knows that each day will be finitely good,
but there are infinitely many days. One wants to choose how good each day
should be. We might represent this by saying that each day corresponds to
a natural number, and the happiness of that day is also represented by
a natural number. Thus, the choices can be represented by sequences of
natural numbers. It is plausible to say that if one sequence is strictly higher
than another on all but finitely many of the terms, then it is better.
However, this preference ordering can’t be represented by the standard
ordering on the real numbers, no matter how one assigns real numbers to
these sequences.
There is clearly no best sequence, so the set of real numbers that repre-
sents the values must not have a highest element. But for any non-empty set S
of real numbers with no highest element, there is a countable subset C that “ex-
hausts” the set, in the sense that for every member of S, there is a member of C
that is higher than it. However, no countable subset of the sequences of natural
numbers exhausts this set — one can always construct a sequence of natural
numbers that is higher than every member of some countable set by letting the
nth member of the sequence be higher than any of the first n members of any
of the first n sequences. Thus, no set of real numbers can have the same ordinal
structure as these sequences.
philosophers’ imprint - 4 - vol. 14, no. 27 (august, 2014)
kenny easwaran Decision Theory without Representation Theorems
But certain alternatives will allow versions of my theory to work even
without having well-defined numerical probabilities and utilities.
A project like mine has been worked on by Martin Peterson (2002;
2004). He aims to justify something like standard expected utility the-
ory, starting with probability and utility. However, instead of construct-
ing the whole ordering, he only aims to say which options are best. Part
of this is because he aims to work only with sets of acts that could be
the available choices for an agent, while I will aim to give preferences
over very rich sets that include many options that are not actually
available. But even among the available options, I think it is important
to figure out which non-ideal options are better or worse than others.
Some ways of being irrational are more irrational than others. (This is
especially true if some sort of “satisficing” view of choiceworthiness
is the right one.) Additionally, I will show how my ordering can be
modified to give alternatives to expected utility theory, in addition to
showing how it can give rise to that theory.
The ordering I give will not be a total ordering. That is, there will
be some pairs of acts such that my theory says neither that the agent
should prefer one to the other nor that the agent should be indifferent
between them. There are two potential sources of this incompleteness.
One source of incompleteness is that there may in fact be pairs of
acts that are incomparable. This could be because they give rise to
outcomes that are incomparable; an agent might radically prefer a life
in the army in some ways and a life in the priesthood in other ways,
but they may be so different that there is no way to make an overall
comparison. Or it could be because the outcomes are all measurable
in a standard way, but the pattern of probabilities and utilities makes
it impossible for there to be such a thing as the overall value, as one
might think for Nover and Hájek’s “Pasadena game” and other related
gambles.
Another source is that this incompleteness is an essential part of
the intermediate steps of my construction, and I don’t claim to have
reached the final step of the construction so far. I start with an order-
ing that is very incomplete and gradually show how to fill it in, piece
by piece. For the intermediate orderings in the construction, much of
the incompleteness is just a way to leave things open for further devel-
opment of the theory. The version of the theory I reach by the end likely
has some of the same incompleteness — there’s no clear reason to think
that it includes all rationally required preferences. Cases where the re-
sulting ordering is incomplete could be cases that will eventually be
determined by some further addition to the theory, or they could be
cases of essential incomparability. It would be interesting to pursue a
development of the theory that could in fact naturally give rise to a
complete ordering, but I don’t yet see a good way to do so.
However, the important point is that judgments made by some inter-
mediate version of the theory will never be reversed in later extensions.
And at each stage, I will check that the resulting theory is consistent
and not merely intuitively plausible. Thus, even an intermediate the-
ory can be useful, since its judgments will also be endorsed by the
final theory. But I take no stand on whether the incomparabilities that
remain at the end are essential, or whether they too can be decided by
further extensions of the theory.
2. Structure of a New Theory
In this section, I will outline the way a theory of my sort can be de-
veloped without representation theorems. In section 3 I will then give
an extended development of a theory of this type, showing that it can
generate all the preferences given by expected utility calculations, and
more. But the general framework of the theory could also be devel-
oped in a different way by theorists who endorse some alternative role
for credence and utility other than maximizing expected utility. (Most
such theorists, like Buchak (2013), are motivated by considerations of
risk-aversion, but there could conceivably be alternative reasons to pur-
sue such a theory.) The subsections of this section give the mathemati-
cal formalism behind the characterization given here.
The central observation in the development of my theory is that if
one ought to prefer act A to act B, and one ought to be indifferent be-
tween acts B and C, then one ought to prefer A to C. Thus, the way a
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theory of my sort is built up is to start with a basic relation that charac-
terizes cases where a rational agent ought to prefer one act to another,
and then find further relations that characterize cases where a rational
agent ought to be indifferent between acts. Using these relations, one
can then characterize a wider set of cases in which agents ought to
prefer one act to another.
For technical reasons, it will be useful to start with a pair of pref-
erence relations,  and , with the former indicating cases where an
agent is rationally required to strictly prefer one act to another, and
the latter indicating cases where an agent is rationally required to find
one act at least as good as another. There will also be an indifference
relation ≈, which can be defined by saying that A ≈ B iff A  B and
B  A. Note that I will not assume that A  B iff A  B or A ≈ B —
which of the two possibilities holds may be undecided at the beginning
of the process and settled only later.
The essential thing to make sure that the resulting theory is consis-
tent is to make sure that if one is required to strictly prefer one act to
another, then one is never required at a later stage to be indifferent be-
tween the acts or prefer them in the reverse order. This is the condition
of “compatibility” that will be formally defined in section 2.2. Com-
patibility will ensure that the theory is consistent. Axiomatic decision
theories with representation theorems just take the consistency and
transitivity of preference as a primitive assumption that is necessary
in order to be represented by a probability and a utility, while my the-
ory will show how the existence of probability and utility guarantees
that the resulting norms on preference are consistent and transitive.
To simplify both the checking of compatibility and the definition of
the extended preference relations from the basic preference and indif-
ference relations, I define a notion of “commutativity” in section 2.2.
The idea is that if one starts with an arbitrary preference relation 
and indifference relation ≈, then to find out that one is required to
prefer act A to A′, one might need to note a long sequence of interven-
ing relations. For instance, perhaps A  B ≈ B′  B′′ ≈ B′′′  A′. It
can be quite difficult to make sure that no long chain like this shows
that some new preference is required that is incompatible with old
preferences. If two relations are commutative, however, any chain like
this can be compressed into a single preference followed by a single in-
difference. Although there’s no reason to think that every normatively
required preference relation should commute with every normatively
required indifference relation, it will turn out that all the relations I
consider do commute, at least when a suitably large collection of acts
are considered. Thus, because this greatly simplifies the arguments, my
mathematical framework will require that the relevant relations always
commute with each other. To guarantee this, I need the set of acts un-
der consideration to be suitably rich. However, my arguments require
only the norms governing an agent’s preferences to apply to this large
set of acts, and they don’t require the agents to actually ever consider
such acts, much less to have such acts available.
The remainder of this section develops the mathematical tools
needed to give a version of the theory and prove that it is consistent.
Some of the details are inessential to understand the general ideas of
section 3, but they will be needed if one wants to track the details. In
section 2.1, I define the basic features that preference and indifference
relations have, as well as some features that other related relations may
have. In section 2.2 I then give the formal definition of what it takes for
two relations to commute, and show how commutativity enables a sim-
ple definition of the preference relation implied by an initial preference
relation and an indifference relation. I also give the formal definition
of what it takes for an indifference relation to be compatible with a
preference relation. In section 2.3 I then show how these features for
pairs of relations can be generalized to larger sets, and show how this
can be used to build up a full decision theory from a very sparse initial
preference relation and a sequence of indifference relations. Section 3
then develops a version of decision theory in this way.
2.1 Orderings and equivalence relations
The symbol I will use for an abstract binary relation is ‘∼’, possibly
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with a subscript, though I will use other symbols for specific types
of relations. For each such relation, there will be some set of objects
called its domain that are the possible relata. (For the preference and
indifference relations, the domain will be acts, but I will discuss some
relations on other domains as well.) I won’t ask of two objects whether
they bear some relation or not unless both objects are members of the
domain of that relation.
I will use the following standard definitions (in all cases, the quan-
tifiers range only over the domain of the relevant relation):
• ∼ is reflexive iff for all A, A ∼ A.
• ∼ is irreflexive iff there is no A such that A ∼ A.
• ∼ is symmetric iff for all A and B, A ∼ B iff B ∼ A.
• ∼ is anti-symmetric iff there are no A and B such that A ∼ B and
B ∼ A.
• ∼ is transitive iff for all A, B, and C, if A ∼ B and B ∼ C then
A ∼ C.
A weak ordering (which I will generally indicate with the symbol ‘’,
often with a subscript) is any relation that is reflexive and transitive.2
A strict ordering (which I will generally indicate with the symbol ‘’,
often with a subscript) is a relation that is irreflexive and transitive
(and is thus also anti-symmetric). I will sometimes emphasize that an
ordering is partial when there are some pair A, B of elements of the
domain such that neither bears the ordering to the other. Conversely,
I will say that an ordering is total or linear if for all A 6= B, either
A  B or B  A (and similarly for ). An equivalence relation (which I
will generally indicate with the symbol ‘≈’, often with a subscript) is
a relation that is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric.
For two relations ∼X and ∼Y , I will say that ∼Y extends ∼X iff for
every A and B, if A ∼X B then A ∼Y B. When one relation in a set of
2. I don’t assume any sort of anti-symmetry for weak orderings. That is, there
may be distinct A and B such that A  B and B  A. Some mathematicians use
the term “pre-order” in this case, and reserve the word “order” for a relation
such that A  B and B  A entails that A = B, but I will not.
relations extends all relations in that set, I will say that it is the largest
in that set, and when all relations in a set extend a single one, I will
say that the relation is the smallest in that set. As an example, if  is a
weak ordering, and we define A ≈ B iff A  B and B  A, then we
can see that ≈ is the largest equivalence relation that  extends.
2.2 Composition, commutativity, and compatibility of pairs of relations
Consider two relations ∼X and ∼Y on the same domain. I will de-
fine their composition ∼XY by saying that A1 ∼XY B2 iff there is A2
such that A1 ∼X A2 and A2 ∼Y B2. Similarly, their composition in the
other direction is defined by saying that A1 ∼YX B2 iff there is B1 such
that A1 ∼Y B1 and A2 ∼X B2. (The choice of particular letters and
subscripts for these relata and others later is meant to assist in remem-
bering the asserted relations between them, but is not meant to entail
anything about them.)
I will say that ∼X and ∼Y commute with each other iff ∼XY is the
same relation as ∼YX . That is, they commute iff:
• For any A1 and B2, there exists an A2 such that A1 ∼X A2 and
A2 ∼Y B2 iff there exists a B1 such that A1 ∼Y B1 and B1 ∼X B2.
Theorem 1. If ∼X and ∼Y commute, and both are transitive, then their
composition is transitive too.
Theorem 2. If ∼X and ∼Y are both reflexive, then their composition is
reflexive too.
Theorem 3. If ∼X and ∼Y commute, and both are symmetric, then
their composition is symmetric too.
(For these and all further theorems, the proofs are in the appendix.)
Given these results, we can say a lot about the composition of
various relations that commute. The composition of two commuting
weak orderings is a weak ordering, the composition of two commuting
equivalence relations is an equivalence relation, and the composition
of a weak ordering with an equivalence relation it commutes with is a
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weak ordering. It is straightforward to see that the composition of two
equivalence relations that commute is the smallest equivalence relation
that extends both. Thus, since it is plausible that indifference between
acts is required to be an equivalence relation, if we can find two indif-
ference relations that are both normatively required, then their compo-
sition will be as well.
For two relations ∼X and ∼Y , I will say that ∼X is transitive over ∼Y
iff the following two conditions hold:
• If A ∼X B and B ∼Y C, then A ∼X C.
• If A ∼Y B and B ∼X C, then A ∼X C.
It is straightforward to see that if a weak ordering and an equivalence
relation commute, then their composition is the smallest weak order-
ing that extends the original weak ordering and is transitive over the
equivalence relation. Thus, since it is plausible that weak preference
between acts is required to be transitive over indifference, if we can
find a weak preference relation and an indifference relation that are
both normatively required, then their composition will be as well.
Note that there are further issues with strict orderings. If ∼X and
∼Y are strict orderings that commute, their composition ∼XY is not
necessarily a strict ordering. It is true that ∼XY is transitive, but it is
not clear whether it is irreflexive, as needed for being a strict ordering.
For ∼XY to be irreflexive, meaning there is no A with A ∼XY A, is just
for there not to be A and B with A ∼X B and B ∼Y A.
Thus, I will say that ∼X and ∼Y are compatible iff there are no A
and B such that A ∼X B and B ∼Y A, since this is precisely the con-
dition that must hold between two commuting transitive relations for
their composition to be a strict ordering. I will normally talk about this
condition only in cases where at least one of ∼X or ∼Y is itself a strict
ordering.
It is straightforward to see that if a strict ordering and an equiva-
lence relation commute, then their composition is the smallest strict or-
dering that extends the original and is transitive over the equivalence
relation. Since it is plausible that strict preference must be transitive
over indifference, if we can find normatively required strict preference
and indifference relations, then their composition will itself yield a
normatively required set of strict preferences.
Note that none of this suggests that individual relations that are
normatively required will generally commute with each other. All we
can say so far is that discussion of what is normatively required is
much simpler when the relations do commute. As it turns out, the
relations I will discuss in section 3 do in fact commute, but if the set of
acts I consider didn’t have a certain richness to it, then they would not.
However, as long as the relations we consider are interpreted as saying
that the agent ought to prefer one act to another, then it won’t matter
whether the agent actually does have preferences over this rich set of
acts, as long as there are norms that apply to the agent’s preferences
among these acts.
2.3 Interactions of multiple relations
The theory I build up will be constructed in multiple steps. Thus, we
won’t always be checking commutativity, compatibility, and composi-
tion of pairs of relations, but will sometimes need to check them for
larger sets of relations as well.
Theorem 4. If ∼X , ∼Y , and ∼Z are three relations, and ∼XY is the
composition of ∼X with ∼Y , and ∼YZ is the composition of ∼Y with
∼Z, then the composition ∼(XY)Z of ∼XY with ∼Z is the same as the
composition ∼X(YZ) of ∼X with ∼YZ.
Thus, if ∼X , ∼Y , and ∼Z commute with each other pairwise, then
the composition of the three relations is uniquely defined, regardless
of the order in which they are combined, and this composition can be
referred to as ∼XYZ, or ∼ZXY , or any other permutation of the three.
Similar considerations apply to larger sets of relations that all commute
with each other pairwise.
If X is a strict ordering, and ∼Y and ∼Z are both transitive, and all
three relations commute with each other, then previous results show
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that their composition is a strict ordering if X is compatible with
∼YZ, or if XY is compatible with ∼Z, or if XZ is compatible with
∼Y . That is, there must be no A, B, C with A X B ∼Y C ∼Z A. In
such a case, I will say that the relations are mutually compatible. Because
of commutativity, if there are no such A, B, C bearing these relations,
then no triplet bears these three relations in a different order either.
Thus, proving the non-existence of such a triplet with one ordering of
the relations is sufficient for proving mutual compatibility. The same
holds for compositions of larger sets of relations, and I will call such
larger sets mutually compatible in the parallel case.
If X is a strict ordering, and ∼Y and ∼Z are both equivalence re-
lations, then the set of all three is mutually compatible only if both ∼Y
and ∼Z are compatible with X . However, this is not sufficient (even in
the presence of commutativity) for the set to be mutually compatible.
(See the appendix for a counterexample.) Thus, although commutativ-
ity can be checked pairwise for any set of relations, compatibility must
be checked for the set as a whole.
3. One Version of the Theory
The remainder of this paper presents a version of decision theory that
works according to the framework defined above. I think that the re-
lations presented here are normative for decision theory, but if some
of them are not, then they can be switched out for others that might
do some of the same work. Thus, this final section is primarily for pur-
poses of giving a worked-out example of the decision theory, showing
that it can be used to extend standard expected utility theory. As men-
tioned earlier, I think this is particularly important in justifying the
calculations made by expected-accuracy theorists, who often want to
define probability in a way that is prior to decision theory. But I think
it is also of interest to see how the resulting theory relates acts that
can’t be related by expected utility theory itself. I also discuss several
weakenings of the assumptions that might allow generalization of the
theory.
In section 3.1, I define the notion of “act” over which preferences
will be defined. In particular, I assume that the agent has a basic pref-
erence relation over possible “outcomes” of acts, and I represent acts
by arbitrary functions from “states” to outcomes. However, I don’t as-
sume that acts are defined over the same sets of states — different acts
may create different amounts of indeterminacy in the world that could
play a role in determining their different outcomes.
In section 3.2, I then describe the basic preference relations  and
 that the theory will be based on. These relations are relations of
dominance, in which one act gives a better outcome than another in
every state. These relations are defined only for acts defined over the
same set of states, so they are quite limited indeed. I contrast the two
specific relations  and  with a relation ′ that one might expect
to be normative, but will turn out in later subsections to have some
problematic interactions with various indifference relations. Clarifying
the status of this relation, and its interaction with various proposed
indifference relations, will be a major topic for future research.
In section 3.3, I introduce the first basic indifference relation, which
says that one should be indifferent between two acts not only if they
give the same outcomes in the same states, but if there is an “appro-
priate” correspondence between the states the two acts are defined
on such that they give the same outcome in corresponding states. In
section 3.4, I then introduce various amounts of comparative and nu-
merical probability theory, and show how they can be used to sharpen
up the notion of appropriateness here. I show that the resulting indif-
ference relation is compatible with dominance under certain plausible
assumptions (if either the probability function has no “null” sets other
than the empty set, or the probability function is countably additive
and the set of outcomes is “separable”). I also show that (assuming a
sort of “homogeneity” of the probability function) the resulting indif-
ference relation, when combined with the basic dominance relations,
gives all the preferences of “stochastic dominance”.
In section 3.5, I introduce a notion of “differences” among out-
comes, and use this to define a new indifference relation between acts.
In particular, two acts will be equivalent if the set of states in which the
philosophers’ imprint - 9 - vol. 14, no. 27 (august, 2014)
kenny easwaran Decision Theory without Representation Theorems
first is better has the same probability as the set of states in which the
second is better, and if the differences between the outcomes in corre-
sponding states are all the same. The idea is that the better outcomes of
one act can serve as a “trade-off” for the worse outcomes that it gives.
I also show various results about the interaction of this trade-off equiv-
alence with the other relations mentioned earlier. In particular, I show
that trade-off equivalence is compatible with the dominance relations,
assuming that outcomes are linearly ordered and that probabilities are
linearly ordered and additive (though not necessarily numerical). I also
show that if probabilities and outcomes are numerical, then trade-off
equivalence and dominance together give all preferences between acts
of finite expected value on a single state space. Finally, I show that
under these conditions, the resulting relation is compatible with the
indifference relation given by permutations of states that respect the
probability function, which allows the overall preference relation to ac-
count for preferences among acts of finite expected value on different
state spaces, and also for many intuitive comparisons of acts whose ex-
pected utilities are infinite or undefined. In section 3.5.5, I also suggest
that a modified version of my theory may be able to accommodate the
phenomenon of risk-sensitivity, which representation theorems must
be completely redone to do.
Thus, I show that, starting with a very restricted preference relation,
a few intuitively reasonable indifferences can give rise to full expected
utility theory under some natural conditions. But I also show that the
theory built from these basic preferences and indifferences can func-
tion without the full strength of these structural assumptions, unlike
the theory built from representation theorems. The set of acts over
which these relations are defined is quite rich, and plausibly includes
many acts that agents never in fact consider. However, if we interpret
these preference and indifference relations as ones that the agent ought
to have, then we don’t need to assume that agents in fact have these
preferences, as we would if we were basing a representation theorem
on these preferences.
3.1 Background for Decision Theory
I adopt the basic framework of Savage (1954) rather than Jeffrey (1965)
— I assume that an act is a function that assigns some “outcome” to
each “state of the world”. Additionally, every such function counts as
an act. (In section 3.4.1 I make a slight restriction on this full combi-
natorial space of acts, but it is still quite large.) Most such acts are
not available for an agent to perform in any situation, but there is still
some sense to be made of them as hypothetical acts. For Savage and
Jeffrey, it is important to idealize and assume that agents actually have
preferences over all these acts. However, for my theory, it is important
just that an agent’s credences and values for outcomes implicitly define
preferences that she ought to have over all these acts if she considers
them. (See Dreier (1996) for more on hypothetical preferences.)
Unlike standard decision theorists, I do not assume that there is a
single set S of “states of the world” that all acts are defined on. Instead,
I allow that different acts might depend on distinct sets of states. This
is because states are supposed to represent the features of the world
that determine what the outcome of a given act is, and in cases of inde-
terminism, some of those relevant features may themselves depend on
the agent’s act. For instance, if one act involves flipping a coin, and an-
other one doesn’t, then the former act is going to have states in which
the coin comes up heads and other states in which the coin comes
up tails. Perhaps the agent thinks that there are objective features of
the world that causally determine how the coin would have come up,
even if the coin isn’t actually flipped, but this seems like a strong meta-
physical commitment.3 A better solution is to allow that the acts have
different state spaces as their domains.4
3. An interesting version of a theory like this has been developed by Stefáns-
son and Bradley (2015).
4. This allowance also means that I don’t automatically give a potentially prob-
lematic treatment of the Newcomb problem. If one-boxing and two-boxing are
acts defined on the same state space, with a given probability distribution, then
there is no way for the states to have different probabilities for the two acts. Jef-
frey allows this problem by using possible worlds instead of states, and iden-
tifying both acts and outcomes with sets of worlds. Savage does not consider
philosophers’ imprint - 10 - vol. 14, no. 27 (august, 2014)
kenny easwaran Decision Theory without Representation Theorems
For a given act A, SA is the set of states that A is defined on. I
assume that these state spaces for distinct acts are either identical or
completely disjoint. That is, for any two acts, either every state that
could determine the outcome of one could determine the outcome of
the other, or there is no state that could determine the outcome of both.
I assume, however, that there is a single set O of outcomes. They
represent everything that an agent values in the world. That is, it
shouldn’t matter to the agent which act gives rise to a given outcome,
if they each really give rise to the same outcome. If there are two ways
to get the same outcome that an agent has a preference between, then
the theorist has not made a fine enough distinction among outcomes.
The outcomes come with a strict ordering >v (the v stands for
“value”) representing the agent’s preference of one outcome over an-
other, and an equivalence relation ≡v representing the agent’s indiffer-
ence between two outcomes. I will assume that the relations are com-
patible, and that >v is transitive over ≡v, and define ≥v as the relation
that holds whenever either >v or ≡v does. At some points (which I
will mention explicitly), it will be useful to assume that these relations
give a linear ordering, which means that for every pair of outcomes
o1, o2, either o1 >v o2, o1 ≡v o2, or o2 >v o1. I will sometimes replace
talk of outcomes with talk of “utilities”, which I will just assume are
outcomes whose value ordering has a natural representation by the
standard ordering on the real numbers. But most of the time I will just
work with the general framework of partially ordered outcomes.
the Newcomb problem, and in fact appears to rule it out entirely. He implic-
itly assumes throughout that acts play no role in causally determining which
state of the world is actual. And his remarks on “grand world” and “small
world” decision problems in section 5 of Chapter 5 seem to imply that states,
and the values of outcomes, must be probabilistically independent of acts as
well. But in the Newcomb problem, there is no identification of states that is
both probabilistically and causally independent of acts. I want to preserve Sav-
age’s conceptual distinctions while not automatically ruling out cases like this.
This will be discussed further in section 3.3.2, though I won’t attempt to fully
address the problem.
3.2 Dominance
Since an act is a function from states to outcomes, we can use these
relations on outcomes to define relations on acts. The basic idea is
that preferences among acts should be governed by the values of the
outcomes they can produce. If one act is guaranteed to give a better
outcome than another, then one ought to prefer the former. Thus, we
can define:
A  B iff SA = SB and (∀s ∈ SA)(A(s) >v B(s)),
A  B iff SA = SB and (∀s ∈ SA)(A(s) ≥v B(s)),
A ≈ B iff SA = SB and (∀s ∈ SA)(A(s) ≡v B(s)).
I will use these as my basic relations. It is straightforward to see that 
is transitive over  and ≈, and that  is transitive over ≈. Thus, these
can form the core of a decision theory if they are supplemented with
a variety of equivalence relations that are compatible with each other,
and with all of these relations.
One can see that A ≈ B iff A  B and B  A. However, it is not
the case that A  B iff A  B and B 6 A — if A gives strictly better
outcomes than B in some states and exactly equal outcomes in others,
then A  B and B 6 A, but A 6 B. Thus, one might define:
A ′ B iff A  B and B 6 A,
or equivalently
A ′ B iff SA = SB and (∀s ∈ SA)(A(s) ≥v B(s)) and (∃s ∈ SA)(A(s) >v B(s)).
However, I will show that although  is compatible with each indiffer-
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ence relation I will mention, ′ is compatible with only some of them.
Thus, I think we should focus on  rather than ′ as the basis of de-
cision theory. For now, however, I introduce both relations just to help
clarify what  does and doesn’t mean.
These relations are quite restricted, so that they don’t let us compare
many pairs of acts. For instance, an act that yields $10 if a Democrat
is elected president and $30 if a Democrat is not elected can’t be com-
pared to an act that yields $20 in either case. However, the most basic
preferences can be accounted for. If you prefer apples to oranges, and
oranges to nothing, then an act that gives you an apple if a black ball
is drawn from an urn and an orange otherwise should be preferred
to an act that gives you an orange if a black ball is drawn from an
urn and nothing otherwise. These preferences are plausible regardless
of whether or not there is any further structure to the values of the
outcomes and the probabilities of the states.
3.3 Permutations and Correspondences
These existing relations so far only compare acts that are defined over
the same state space. If two acts have different state spaces, then there
is so far no way to compare them. An act whose outcome depends on
the result of a coin flip can’t be compared to an act whose outcome
depends on a different indeterministic process. The goal of this sub-
section is to give a mathematical formalism for connecting different
state spaces, and show conditions under which the resulting equiva-
lence relation is compatible with and commutes with all the orderings
given so far. But the resulting relation is also able to introduce new
comparisons among acts on a single state space.
The basic idea is that even though two acts may be defined on
different state spaces, there may be an important sense in which states
in one space naturally “correspond” to states in another space. If act
A involves flipping a fair coin, and act B involves rolling a six-sided
die and seeing whether the face that comes up is odd or even, then
there is a sense in which one can say that heads corresponds to odd
and tails to even, or vice versa. This can then give a sense in which
certain acts are equivalent to others, if they give the same outcomes
in corresponding states, even though they depend on different states.
This idea is suggested by Schick (2003), though I am generalizing it
quite a bit.
Section 3.3.1 gives the formal requirements on any such relation,
and shows that any such relation is compatible with the dominance
relations. Section 3.3.2 shows that appropriate understanding of the
notion of “correspondence” can allow for compatibility with intuitive
preferences in some cases that expected utility has a hard time with.
But full development of the idea will wait until section 3.4, where I
introduce probability theory.
3.3.1 Formal definitions
A correspondence of one set to another is a one-to-one, total function
from the first set onto the other. The first set is called the domain of
the correspondence, and the second is called the range. That is, a cor-
respondence of S1 to S2 is a function f that is defined for all elements
of S1, such that for every s2 in S2, there is a unique s1 in S1 such that
f (s1) = s2. We can denote this unique element s1 as f−1(s2), and it is
straightforward to check that in this case, f−1 is itself a function, and
in fact is a correspondence of S2 to S1. f−1 is known as the inverse of
f . If f is a correspondence from S1 to S2, and g is a correspondence
from S2 to S3, then there is a correspondence g f from S1 to S3 defined
by g f (s) = g( f (s)), and g f is known as the composition of f and g. Of
course, the composition of two correspondences is defined only if the
domain of g is the range of f .
A correspondence of a set to itself is called a permutation. For any
set S there is a trivial permutation idS called the “identity”, which has
the definition that for all s in S, idS(s) = s. idS has the special feature
that it is its own inverse. If S has more than one element, then there
are of course plenty of other permutations of a set as well, and some
of them even have the feature of being their own inverse. If f is any
correspondence from S to any set, then the composition f−1 f just is
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idS.
When talking about multiple acts that are defined on multiple dif-
ferent sets of states, we will be interested in a whole collection of cor-
respondences between the various state spaces. Consider a collection
of sets, and a set G of correspondences among them. We say that G is
a groupoid iff it satisfies the following three conditions:
• For each set S in the collection, idS is in G.
• For each correspondence f that is in G, f−1 is also in G.
• For any two correspondences f and g in G, if the domain of g is the
range of f , then their composition g f is also in G.
(For those that are familiar with the mathematical notion of a group, it
is just the abstract characterization of a groupoid where all correspon-
dences are in fact permutations of a single set, though many presen-
tations of group theory leave out any mention of this set and focus
instead on the compositions of correspondences.)
Let G be any groupoid on the set of state spaces for all acts. We can
then say that A ≈G B iff there is some g in G whose domain is SA
and whose range is SB, such that for all s in SA, A(s) = B(g(s)). The
idea is that if G is chosen appropriately, one should be indifferent be-
tween A and B, because they give the same outcome in corresponding
circumstances. (For most choices of G, ≈G will not be plausible as an
actual normative requirement, but for the mathematical development
at this point this is not essential. Conditions under which ≈G is more
plausible will be developed in section 3.4.) It is straightforward to see
that ≈G is an equivalence relation.
Theorem 5. If G is any groupoid on the set of state spaces for all acts,
then ≈G commutes with ,,≈, and ′.
(Again, the proof of this theorem, like all others, is in the appendix.)
To make use of this relation, we will have to find some specific
groupoid G and show that ≈G is compatible with , and possibly ′.
So first I will find the most general conditions under which compatibil-
ity can fail. In later sections I will discuss specific groupoids, and show
certain more specific conditions under which compatibility holds or
fails.
Compatibility fails iff there are acts A and B with A  B (or A ′
B) and B ≈G A. B ≈G A means there is some g ∈ G with B(s) =
A(g(s)) for all s. But since A  B, this means that for all s, A(s) >v
B(s) = A(g(s)) (or A(s) ≥v B(S) = A(g(s)) for ′, with at least one
such pair having a strict inequality). Similarly, A(g(s)) >v B(g(s)) =
A(g(g(s))), A(g−1(s)) >v B(g−1(s)) = A(s), and so on. Thus, for ≈G
to be incompatible with , there must be a g such that for every state s,
the states gn(s) are all distinct, while for ≈G to be incompatible with
, there must be a g such that for some state s, the states gn(s) are all
distinct.
Conversely, if the states s, g(s), g(g(s)), . . . are all distinct, then so
are the states g−1(s), g−1(g−1(s)), . . . . If there are outcomes · · · >v
o−2 >v o−1 >v o0 >v o1 >v o2 >v . . . , then there is an act that assigns
A(gn(s)) = on for each n. In this case, we can show that ≈G is incom-
patible with ′, and similarly for  if every state s has this property.
It is straightforward to check that these conditions are necessary and
sufficient for incompatibility of the relevant relations.
If each state space SA is finite, then it doesn’t matter what groupoid
G is considered — for every permutation g and every state s, the se-
quence s, g(s), g(g(s)), . . . forms a cycle, and it is impossible for any
act to assign a strictly decreasing sequence of outcomes to all these
elements. Thus, I have shown that for at least some groupoids and sets
of acts, the equivalence relation ≈G is compatible with both  and ′,
and we can define a decision theory using its compositions with them,
G and ′G. In section 3.4 I will give some more general conditions for
compatibility that don’t assume that the sets of states or outcomes are
finite, as well as developing plausible requirements on G for ≈G to be
normatively significant.
3.3.2 Applications
This general proposal is inspired by some ideas of Frederick Schick.
In his (2003), he proposes a consideration of acts as being defined on
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different state spaces as a way to clarify some of the issues around the
Newcomb problem. In this problem, the agent is given the choice be-
tween taking just the contents of an opaque box, or taking the contents
of that box together with a transparent box that contains $1000. The
contents of the opaque box were determined by a very reliable predic-
tor, which has put $1,000,000 in it if it predicted that the agent will take
only the one box, and nothing if it predicted that the agent will take
both.
A naive approach says that the two acts are defined on the same
state space, which can be taken to have one state where the opaque
box is full of money and one state where the opaque box is empty.
In either state, it is better to take both boxes, so dominance says that
two-boxing is better than one-boxing.
However, Schick suggests that the reliability of the predictor means
that the state where the money is in the box when the agent takes one
box doesn’t naturally correspond to the state where the money is in
the box when the agent takes two boxes. Thus, we should take the two
acts to be defined over separate state spaces, which happen to have
homophonous descriptions of states that don’t correspond.
Some causal decision theorists argue that Schick is wrong, and say
that the correspondence is in fact natural. Schick instead proposes a
correspondence that connects the states in the two spaces based on
whether the predictor has predicted correctly. Under the first corre-
spondence, the composition of dominance and correspondence again
supports two-boxing. But under the second correspondence, the com-
position of dominance and correspondence doesn’t yet determine any-
thing, and some further rule (possibly involving probability) must be
used.
Thus, this proposal doesn’t immediately resolve the Newcomb para-
dox. It is compatible with either response, provided that one has fur-
ther means to determine which correspondence(s) are relevant. I won’t
aim to resolve this question in this paper.
As another example, consider the “proto-Ellsberg” situation where
a ball is about to be drawn from an urn containing an unknown num-
ber of black and white balls. Consider the acts B1, B2, W1, W2, where
B1 (resp. W1) results in a gain of $1 if a black (resp. white) ball is
drawn and nothing otherwise, and B2 (resp. W2) results in a gain of $2
if a black (resp. white) ball is drawn and nothing otherwise. We can
identify the states here as “a black ball is drawn” and “a white ball is
drawn”. In this case, there seems to be no objection to thinking of the
state space as identical for all acts. Assuming that $2 >v $1 >v 0, we
thus have B2  B1 and W2 W1, but we have no comparisons between
one of B1 or B2 and one of W1 or W2.
There are two natural ways to think about this situation. One might
think that the subjective uncertainty about the number of black and
white balls makes these other pairs all incomparable, so that domi-
nance tells us all the normative facts there are about preference. Or
one might think that the symmetry of the situation makes the states
“a black ball is drawn” and “a white ball is drawn” interchangeable
for the agent.5 In the latter case, we can then consider the group G of
permutations that includes both the identity id and the interchange g
of the two states. Then we can see that since W1(s) = B1(g(s)) for all
s, this means that W1 ≈G B1, and similarly W2 ≈G B2. Composing this
relation with dominance, we see that W2 G B1 and B2 G W1. This
would then settle all comparisons among the four acts.
This illustrates the sorts of considerations that go into determining
what G to use — it depends on which states are taken to be inter-
changeable as far as preference among acts should go.
5. A third intuitive response might be to prefer B2 to W1 and W2 to B1, on the
grounds that they give strictly better benefits, while taking W1 and B1 to be
incomparable on the grounds of radical uncertainty, as well as W2 and B2. This
set of preferences can’t be achieved by any version of the theory described in
this paper, because it includes more preferences than strict dominance but has
no indifferences other than identity.
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3.4 Probability
As suggested by the last example, probability is a natural concept to
use to limit the sorts of correspondences between state spaces that are
appropriate to use in an indifference relation. For much of the 20th
century, the primary justifications for using probability theory to de-
scribe notions of confidence or degree of belief have based the theory
of probability on that of preference. These are the “Dutch book argu-
ment” used by Ramsey (1926) and de Finetti (1937), and the standard
representation theorems of decision theory, which also date back to
Ramsey but were later extended by Savage, Jeffrey, and others. Since
these arguments seek to derive probabilism from a full theory of pref-
erence, there would be a kind of circularity in then basing a theory of
preference on probability.
However, there has also been a competing tradition among epis-
temologists that seeks to justify probabilism on the grounds of some
pure epistemic value, without assuming a general theory of prefer-
ence. One version of this, exemplified by Cox (1946) and Jaynes (2003),
makes some technical mathematical assumptions about the structure
of uncertainty. (For instance, they assume that an agent’s degree of be-
lief in a proposition determines her degree of belief in the negation,
and that an agent’s degree of belief in two incompatible propositions
determines her degree of belief in the disjunction.) From these assump-
tions, they show that any such set of degrees of belief can be repre-
sented by a numerical function satisfying the probability axioms. The
assumptions that go into the proof are quite strong ones, and may be
seen as question-begging (since they assume features that correspond
to all of the probability axioms, even if they are not identical to them),
but for at least some researchers, this has been considered a strong
enough motivation for probabilism that can be carried out completely
prior to and independent of any theory of rational preference.
Another tradition, dating back at least as far as van Fraassen (1983),
but perhaps put forward most widely to formal epistemologists by
Joyce (1998), has more detailed foundations. Joyce considers (inspired
by James (1896)) the idea that belief is a state aimed at the truth, and
extends it to a notion of confidence that is aimed at “closeness to the
truth”. He shows that if this notion of closeness satisfies certain ba-
sic conditions, then any credal state that fails to satisfy the probability
axioms is dominated by a different credal state that does satisfy them.
Thus, he is able to justify the probability axioms as constraints on ratio-
nal credence without assuming any constraint on rational preference
beyond dominance, which I have also taken as basic.
On this picture one can start with dominance as the basic princi-
ple governing rational preference. Given a notion of “closeness to the
truth”, one can then argue that credences ought to obey probabilism.
Using the ideas discussed in the rest of sections 3.4 and 3.5, we can
then defend the standard role of expected value in determining pref-
erence. Finally, the results of Greaves and Wallace (2006), Leitgeb and
Pettigrew (2010), and Easwaran (2013) can then use expected closeness
to the truth to get further constraints on credence and the way it is up-
dated. Thus, there is a satisfying and non-circular interplay between
credence and preference.
In section 3.4.1 I give the basic background for any theory of prob-
ability, laying the groundwork for which sets of states even have prob-
abilities. In section 3.4.2, I then set out a basic theory of comparative
probability (which doesn’t assume as much as the numerical proba-
bility theories endorsed by Jaynes and Joyce) and use it to give some
general conditions under which ≈G is compatible with  and ′, and
some conditions under which it is compatible with  but not ′. In
section 3.4.3, I then define full numerical probability, and show that
combining ≈G with dominance can give plausible preferences between
acts that can’t be compared by expected utility theory (though it does
not yet give preferences for all acts that can be compared by expected
utility theory). Finally, in section 3.4.4, I show that under some ho-
mogeneity assumptions about the spaces of states, the combination of
≈G with dominance gives a preference relation that is exactly that of
“stochastic dominance”. That final section is not important for the later
parts of the paper and can be skipped by readers who want to avoid
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the most dense mathematical technicalities.
3.4.1 Measurability
Probability is a feature of sets of states. However, not every set of states
is eligible to have a probability. For instance, if there are multiple state
spaces, then a set that contains states from different spaces doesn’t
have a probability. But in many cases, if a single state space is infinite,
then not every subset of that space has a probability either. Instead, we
define some collection of sets of states to be the measurable ones, and
say that probability applies to all and only the measurable sets.
For each state space, I will assume that the collection of subsets of it
that are measurable forms an algebra. This means that the empty set is
measurable, the complement of any measurable subset of a state space
is measurable, and the intersection of two measurable subsets is mea-
surable. This implies that each state space also counts as a measurable
set (since it is the complement of the empty set), and that the union of
any two measurable subsets of the same state space is itself measurable.
I will sometimes further assume that the collection of measurable sets
forms a σ-algebra, which means that not only is the intersection of two
measurable sets measurable, but also the intersection of any countably
infinite collection of measurable sets is measurable.
Although probability doesn’t apply to sets of outcomes or sets of
real numbers directly, it is also useful to refer to some of these sets
as “measurable” as well. For any given outcome o, I define the sets
O>o = {x ∈ O|x >v o}, O≥o = {x ∈ O|x ≥v o}, O<o = {x ∈ O|x <v
o}, and O≤o = {x ∈ O|o ≤v x} to be measurable, and the measurable
sets of outcomes to be exactly the ones that can be achieved from these
by iterating the operations of complement and intersection (finite or
countable, depending on which assumption has been made for sets of
states).6 Similarly for real numbers — I define the sets R>x = {y ∈
6. If the set of outcomes is separable (as defined in section 3.4.2) then any
of these four types of sets are constructible from the others by iteration of
complement and countable intersection. However, if the set of outcomes is not
separable, and if only finite intersections are allowed, then we may need to
include several of these types of sets as basic measurable sets of outcomes.
R|y > x} and R<x = {y ∈ R|y < x} to be measurable, and define
the measurable sets of real numbers to be exactly the ones that can
be achieved from these by iterating the operations of complement and
intersection. (For those that are familiar with the term, even countable
intersection gives rise only to the Borel measurable sets — one could
go further and use the Lebesgue measurable sets, but this won’t be
needed for my purposes.)
Given these notions of measurability for sets, it is also useful to
define a notion of measurability for a function. A function is said to
be measurable iff for every measurable subset S of its range, the set
{x| f (x) ∈ S} is itself measurable. Since I have defined measurability
for sets of states, sets of outcomes, and sets of real numbers, this gives
notions of measurability for functions from states to states (such as
permutations and correspondences), from states to outcomes (such as
acts), from states to real numbers, and from outcomes to real numbers.
In general, from here on I will restrict attention to measurable func-
tions. In particular, since acts are functions from states to outcomes,
this means that I will restrict attention to acts that are measurable
functions. This is a change from the earlier discussion that included
all functions from states to outcomes as acts.
With these notions of measurability, I can now start the discussion
of how probability limits the appropriate correspondences between
states in various spaces, and eventually use probability to define some
further indifference relations between acts.
3.4.2 Comparative Probability
I start with what I take to be the most minimal notion of probability.
This consists in relations of comparative probability on the measurable
sets of states. The basic assumptions are these:
• >p, ≥p, and ≡p are relations on the set of measurable sets of states.
• >p is a strict ordering, ≥p is a weak ordering, and ≡p is an equiva-
lence relation.
• >p is compatible with and transitive over each of the other two
relations, and ≥p is transitive over ≡p.
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• For any measurable s1 and s2, if s1 ⊆ s2 then s2 ≥p s1.
• If S is any full state space and ∅ is the empty set, then S >p ∅.
• If S1 and S2 are two full state spaces, then S1 ≡p S2.7
Note that I don’t assume that comparative probability is a linear order-
ing. In particular, it is natural to think that for at least some measurable
sets that are subsets of disjoint state spaces, there might be no compar-
ative probability relation that holds between them. But the fewer sets
are comparable, the more restricted the notion of ≈G governed by com-
parative probability turns out to be as an indifference relation.
One piece of notation that is useful to have is the application of
a function to a set of elements rather than to an individual element.
If f is any function and S is any subset of its domain, then I define
f [S] = { f (x)|x ∈ S}, which is the set we get by applying f to each
element of S.
A correspondence g between two state spaces (or a permutation on
one state space) is said to be measure-preserving iff it is measurable, and
for every measurable subset S of the domain of g, S ≡p g[S]. It is clear
that the identity on any state space is measure-preserving, that the
composition of two measure-preserving correspondences is measure-
preserving, and that the inverse of a measure-preserving correspon-
dence is measure-preserving. Thus, the set of measure-preserving cor-
respondences forms a groupoid.
I suggest that the equivalence relation generated by this groupoid
is the one that should be applied as an indifference relation. More
generally, it seems plausible that whatever groupoid is used must be
7. Other sets of conditions for comparative probability are discussed in Chap-
ter 11 of Fine (1973) and sections 7 and 8 of Chapter 2 of Halpern (2003), as
well as Hawthorne (2015).
a subset of this one. I say that any such groupoid is itself measure-
preserving.
Given that ≈G is a natural indifference relation to apply to acts
when G is a measure-preserving groupoid, I now give some character-
izations of situations in which ≈G is compatible with  or ′. Each
will need some new definitions.
Say that a set S is null iff for every n, there are n disjoint subsets
of a single state space that are all at least as probable as S. A set S is
then non-null iff there is some n such that no n disjoint subsets of a
single state space are all at least as probable as S. (Equivalently, any n
subsets of the same state space that are at least as probable as it must
have some overlap.)
Say that the comparative probability relation is regular iff the empty
set is the only null set. This is a way of generalizing the feature of
finite probability spaces that guarantees that ≈G is compatible with
the preference relations.
Theorem 6. If the probability is regular, and G is measure-preserving,
then ≈G is compatible with ′ (and therefore with ).
Regularity in this sense is a very strong condition on probability
functions, and is often rejected for reasons given in Easwaran (2014).
Thus, it is useful to give another set of more commonly accepted con-
ditions under which ≈G is compatible with , though it turns out that
they allow ≈G to be incompatible with ′.
Say that a set D of outcomes is dense iff the following three condi-
tions hold:
• For every o ∈ O there is d ∈ D with d <v o.
• For every o ∈ O there is d ∈ D with d >v o.
• For every o1 <v o2 ∈ O there is d ∈ D with o1 <v d <v o2.
Say that O is separable iff there is a dense set D ⊆ O that has only
countably many members. Separability is one of the characteristic fea-
tures of the real numbers (the rational numbers form a countable dense
subset of the reals) but it applies to many outcome spaces that aren’t
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straightforwardly numerically measurable, and allows a sort of partial
numerical representation.
Theorem 7. If O is separable, then there is a function R from O to the
real numbers, such that whenever o1 <v o2, it is the case that R(o1) <
R(o2).
A comparative probability is countably partitive iff no non-null set is
a countable union of null sets. Equivalently, every countable partition
of a non-null set has at least one non-null member.8
Theorem 8. If the probability is countably partitive, and the outcome
space is separable, and G is measure-preserving, then≈G is compatible
with .
This theorem will be particularly relevant in the case where out-
comes have real-valued utilities and sets of states have a countably ad-
ditive real-valued numerical probability function. But I give the result
here in its more general form to show that these assumptions aren’t
necessary.
However, these conditions don’t guarantee that ≈G is compatible
with ′.
To see this, let the state space consist of the set of points on the unit
circle, with the comparative probability relation given by the standard
countably additive probability function. Let the outcome space be the
real numbers. Let G be the group of rotations of the unit circle, which
are all measure-preserving correspondences.
Let A be the act that assigns outcome n to every point that is ex-
actly n radians counterclockwise from a given point on the circle (al-
lowing positive and negative integers n), and assigns outcome 0 to
8. In the presence of a homogeneity assumption of the sort used in section
3.4.4, it is sufficient to assume that no state space is a union of countably many
null sets: if some countable union of null sets were non-null, then a union of
finitely many copies of that non-null set would cover the whole space, and this
would induce a covering by n copies of the original countable union, which
would itself be a countable cover of the whole space by null sets.
all other points. Let g be the rotation by 1 radian counterclockwise.
Then A(s) >v A(g(s)) for every s that is an integer number of radians
from the given point, and A(s) ≡v A(g(s)) for all other s. Therefore,
A ′ Ag, so ′ is incompatible with ≈G. In this case it seems more
plausible to me that we should hold onto ≈G as a norm of indifference
than ′ as a norm of preference, but consideration of cases like this
will surely be important for future research.
I have given two sets of conditions on the comparative probability
relation that suffice to make  compatible with ≈G for every measure-
preserving groupoid, but there are surely other sufficient conditions
for compatibility that may be more relevant in particular applications
of decision theory.
3.4.3 Numerical Probability
A numerical probability P is a function that assigns a real number to
every measurable set of states, satisfying the following conditions:
• For any measurable set S, P(S) ≥ 0.
• If S is any full state space, then P(S) = 1.
• If S1 and S2 are two disjoint subsets of the same state space, then
P(S1 ∪ S2) = P(S1) + P(S2).
As I mentioned above, Joyce (1998) has given a justification of these
axioms that depends only on dominance and some ideas of “closeness
to truth”.
Given a numerical probability function, one might naturally define
a comparative probability by saying that for any two measurable sets
of states S1 and S2:
• S1 >p S2 iff P(S1) > P(S2).
• S1 ≥p S2 iff P(S1) ≥ P(S2).
• S1 ≡p S2 iff P(S1) = P(S2).
However, I will not assume these full connections, and instead as-
sume only that for any two measurable sets of states S1 and S2:
• If P(S1) > P(S2), then S1 >p S2.
philosophers’ imprint - 18 - vol. 14, no. 27 (august, 2014)
kenny easwaran Decision Theory without Representation Theorems
• If S1 ≥p S2, then P(S1) ≥ P(S2).
• If S1 ≡p S2, then P(S1) = P(S2).
The stronger definition clearly satisfies these constraints, but if there
are reasons to accept a more refined notion of comparative probabil-
ity than the numerical probability function, then one will have to use
something more like these weaker axioms (Easwaran, 2014).
Even given these weak axioms, it is straightforward to prove that if
g is a measure-preserving correspondence for the comparative proba-
bility, then for any measurable set of states S, P(S) = P(g[S]). Similarly,
one can prove that if S is null, then P(S) = 0. If we assume that the
probability function P is countably additive (meaning that the proba-
bility of a disjoint union of countably many subsets of a single state
space is equal to the sum of their probabilities), then we also get the
consequence that the comparative probability is countably partitive.
Additionally, there are many probability comparisons that are possi-
ble across state spaces given this connection — the only cases where
sets of states might not bear a comparative probability relation to each
other is when they have the same numerical probability.
If there is a numerical probability function, and we let ≈G be the
groupoid of all measure-preserving correspondences between state
spaces for the associated comparative probability relation, then the
combined preference relation G makes many judgments that stan-
dard expected utility theory can’t make. For instance, consider the St.
Petersburg game, where a fair coin is repeatedly flipped until it comes
up heads, and the agent gets 2n units of utility if it takes n flips. The
theory under consideration can tell us to be indifferent between this
St. Petersburg game and one where the coin is repeatedly flipped until
it comes up tails, even though standard expected utility theory merely
tells us that neither of these acts has a finite expected utility. Similarly,
if we consider the Leningrad game defined by Colyvan (2008), where
the agent gets 2n + 1 units of utility if the coin takes n flips, then the
theory here can tell us to prefer a Leningrad game, played for either
heads or tails, to any St. Petersburg game.
Of course, this is all still very weak. For instance, we still can’t
decide between a coin flip for 3 units of utility or nothing, and an act
that guarantees 1 unit of utility. In section 3.4.4 I will demonstrate how
far this theory does go (assuming a technical notion of “homogeneity”
on the sets of states), and in section 3.5 I will add another indifference
relation that allows us to recover all of classical expected utility theory
as well. Putting these relations together, we will have a decision theory
that makes all the comparisons that classical expected utility theory
does, and more, and it will be built in a modular way that allows for
easier modifications.
3.4.4 Stochastic Dominance
This section is more mathematically technical and is unnecessary for
the general results. Readers can thus skip it without much loss. How-
ever, it demonstrates some very strong consequences of some struc-
tural conditions on comparative probability.
Say that a probability function on a set of state spaces is homogeneous
iff whenever S1 and S2 are measurable sets with S1 ≤P S2, there is a
measure-preserving correspondence g whose domain is the state space
S1 is in and whose range is the state space S2 is in, with g[S1] ⊂ S2.
Homogeneity holds for the sorts of state spaces that usually arise
in consideration of continuous probability. For instance, consider a set
of state spaces consisting of dartboards whose coordinates are given
by real numbers, or of infinite sequences of coin flips, with the stan-
dard numerical probability functions on them. Say that S1 <P S2 iff
P(S1) < P(S2) or P(S1) = P(S2) and S1 has a strictly smaller cardinal-
ity than S2 or P(S1) = P(S2) and the complement of S1 has a strictly
larger cardinality than the complement of S2. Say that S1 ≡P S2 iff
P(S1) = P(S2), S1 and S2 have the same cardinality, and their com-
plements also have the same cardinality. For each of these probability
spaces, the comparative probability relation given by this definition is
homogeneous.
The following two theorems show that when probabilities are ho-
mogeneous, any two sets of the same probability can be interchanged,
philosophers’ imprint - 19 - vol. 14, no. 27 (august, 2014)
kenny easwaran Decision Theory without Representation Theorems
and this interchange can be done without disturbing the rest of the
space. The second theorem uses the following definition: comparative
probability is additive iff for every set of states A, and every two sets of
states B and B′ both disjoint from A, A ∪ B ≡P A ∪ B′ iff B ≡P B′.
Theorem 9. If S1 ≡P S2 and the comparative probability relation is
homogeneous, then there is a measure-preserving correspondence g
with g[S1] = S2.
Theorem 10. If S1 and S2 are in the same state space, and the compar-
ative probability relation is homogeneous and additive, then there is
a measure-preserving permutation h such that h[S1] = S2, h[S2] = S1,
and h is the identity on all states outside of S1 ∪ S2.
The next theorem shows that if probabilities are homogeneous, then
two acts with the same probabilities of various outcomes can also be
interchanged. The theorem states that this holds if the act has only
countably many distinct outcomes, and I conjecture that it holds in
general.
Say that an act A is discrete iff it is measurable, and for any o, either
there is no s with A(s) = o, or P(A(s) = o) > 0. (Here, and in what
follows, I use “A(s) = o” to refer to the set {s ∈ SA|A(s) = o}, and
similarly with other conditions on A(s).)
Theorem 11. Let P be a homogeneous probability function. Let A1 and
A2 be any discrete acts such that for every o, (A1(s) = o) ≡P (A2(s) =
o). Then there is a measure-preserving correspondence g such that for
all s, A1(s) = A2(g(s)).
Conjecture. Let P be a homogeneous probability function. Let A1 and
A2 be acts such that for every o, (A1(s) > o) ≡P (A2(s) > o). Then
there is a measure-preserving correspondence g such that for all s,
A1(s) = A2(g(s)). (We may need to assume that O is separable for
this.)
If true, this conjecture means that we can represent an act by its
cumulative distribution function. This is a function CDFA defined onO
such that CDFA(o) = {s ∈ SA|A(s) <v o}. If for every o, CDFA1(o) ≡P
CDFA2(o), then these results say that A1 ≈G A2.
Importantly, this also means that if for every o, CDFA1(o) <P
CDFA2(o), then A1 G A2. This condition is called stochastic dominance
and is a standard generalization of dominance. Thus, if the probability
is homogeneous, and the conjecture is true, then we have shown that
G gives all decisions that stochastic dominance does, and even with-
out the conjecture, this holds for discrete acts. Stochastic dominance is
still not enough for expected utility, but it is a very strong condition
that is often used in applications of decision theory.
3.5 Trade-Offs
The idea of using permutations of the state space to find acts that
one should be indifferent between is that if sets of states S1 and S2 are
interchangeable (meaning that some permutation in the relevant group
interchanges them while leaving other states fixed), then it shouldn’t
matter if an act gives a good outcome in S1 and a bad outcome in
S2, or vice versa. The idea of using measure-preserving permutations
is that probability alone should determine whether sets of states are
interchangeable. But this suggests two further ways that the idea can
be generalized.
First, if probability isn’t homogeneous (for instance, consider a state
space with just three states, one of which has probability 1/2 and the
other two of which have probability 1/4 — the singleton of the former
has the same probability as the set of the other two, but no permuta-
tion interchanges them), permutations alone won’t let us get all the in-
variances we want. Second, it’s natural to consider interchanges where
we don’t entirely interchange the goodness of the outcomes associated
with two states but somehow only exchange some of this goodness. To
do this, we will need to be able to compare not just ordinal goodness
among outcomes, but also differences of goodness between outcomes.
In section 3.5.1 I give the mathematical background for a theory of
differences in value of outcomes. In section 3.5.2 I use this to define
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the notion of “trade-off” equivalence formalizing the above reasoning.
In section 3.5.3 I then show that this equivalence relation commutes
with all the earlier relations, and give various sets of conditions under
which it is compatible with them. (This section can be skipped by read-
ers who are willing to assume compatibility and wish to skip some of
the most technical sections.) In section 3.5.4, I then show that combin-
ing trade-off equivalence with dominance gives all judgments that are
given by traditional expected utility theory on individual state spaces,
and that combining both with permutation equivalence gives all of
traditional expected utility theory and more. In section 3.5.5 I finally
consider prospects for a slight modification of the notion of trade-off
equivalence that might allow for a version of the theory that captures
modifications of expected utility that take risk sensitivity into account.
3.5.1 Differences of Outcomes
I assume that for certain outcomes o1, o2 there is a “difference” o1 − o2
between them, and I denote the set of differences by ‘D’. I require that
differences satisfy the following assumptions:
• For any difference d and outcome o, there is an outcome o′ such
that o′ − o = d.
• There is an operation +d of addition on differences such that for
any differences d1, d2, d3, d1 +d d2 = d2 +d d1, and d1 +d (d2 +d d3) =
(d1 +d d2) +d d3.
• For any outcomes o1, o2, o3, if two of their pairwise differences exist,
then so does the third, and (o1 − o2) +d (o2 − o3) = (o1 − o3).
• There is a difference 0d such that for any difference d, d +d 0d = d.
• For any outcomes o1, o2, o1 =v o2 iff o1 − o2 = 0d.
• For any outcomes o1, o2, if o1 − o2 exists, then o2 − o1 does too.
• For any outcomes o1, o2, if o1 >v o2, then their difference exists, and
o1 − o2 >d 0d.
These assumptions about differences of outcomes are consistent,
and can be satisfied by a variety of different structures. One way is if
outcomes and differences are both represented by real numbers. But
there are also other structures satisfying these features, while giving
up some of the other characteristic features of the real numbers, in-
cluding linearity, density, and the Archimedean principle. The specific
features of differences that I have defined above may themselves not
be essential to my project — perhaps a different way of setting things
up would work as well.
As an example of a non-linear ordering satisfying these features,
consider the following: an idealized agent values money (and debt)
linearly, and finds a career in the military incomparable to a career
in the priesthood, and values nothing else. This agent could have out-
comes with the structure of two separate, incomparable copies of the
real numbers, with differences defined only among outcomes that in-
volve the same career, while differences have the structure of the real
numbers.
As another example, an agent could value having friends, disvalue
having enemies, and value money, but nothing else. Say that the value
of one more friend is always exactly equal to the value of having one
fewer enemy, while being incomparable to the value of any amount
of money. Then every pair of outcomes will have a difference, which
can be thought of as an ordered pair of an integer (the number of
additional friends minus the number of additional enemies) and a real
number (the amount of additional money), but there will be differences
that can’t be compared (when one difference involves adding more
friends, while the other involves adding more money). Additionally,
there will be pairs of outcomes in which one is strictly better than the
other, but there is no outcome that is strictly between them — just
consider two outcomes that have exactly the same amount of money,
but one more friend or one fewer enemy.
Furthermore, we could have a different agent with the same sort of
preferences, except that an additional friend is strictly more valuable
than any amount of money, rather than being incomparable with it.
In that case, the differences have a total ordering, but this ordering
is non-Archimedean — for two outcomes whose difference is purely
monetary, no number of copies of that difference is enough to make
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up for the loss of a friend.
Exactly what feature of the agent’s psychology makes it the case
that they value outcomes in a way that has this sort of difference struc-
ture is beyond the scope of this paper. On a standard representation-
theorem framework, one can derive the difference structure from the
preference ordering. But I can’t do this, because I want to reverse the
order of explanation. I will ignore the question of what determines
the facts about differences, and just show what follows if these facts
can be argued to hold. It is possible that this sort of consideration will
eventually lead one back to a representation-theorem-based account of
decision theory, but perhaps some other technique discussed by Krantz
et al. (1971) can give us a foothold here.
3.5.2 Trade-Offs
For two acts A and B on the same state space, I will define their trade-off
T(A, B) to be (S1, S2, d) iff the following conditions hold:
• S1 and S2 are disjoint sets of states, and d is a difference.
• For all s ∈ S1, A(s)− B(s) = d.
• For all s ∈ S2, B(s)− A(s) = d.
• For all s outside S1 ∪ S2, A(s) ≡v B(s).
The idea is that the triple (S1, S2, d) tells us the two sets of states on
which the acts differ in opposite directions, and the amount by which
they differ.
Now, we can define A ∼v B iff T(A, B) = (S1, S2, d) and S1 ≡P S2
— that is, there is a trade-off between the two acts such that the states
where A is better than B are equally probable as the states where B is
better than A, and the differences in values are the same, in opposite
directions. It is straightforward to see that ∼v commutes with ,
,′, and also with ≈G for any measure-preserving groupoid G. (It is
important that for every d and o, there is an o′ with o′ − o = d, to
make sure that if A1 ∼v A2 and A2  B2, then there is a B1 with
T(A1, A2) = T(B1, B2). Given that B1 exists, it is not hard to see that
A1  B1, and similarly for the other relations.)
Note that ∼v is reflexive (since we can take S1 and S2 to be the
empty set) and symmetric (since we can reverse the role of S2 and
S1). However, it is not transitive. So I define the full trade-off equiva-
lence relation ≈v to be the transitive closure of ∼v. That is, A ≈v B iff
there exists a finite sequence A0, . . . , An such that A = A0 ∼v A1 ∼v
A2 . . . An−1 ∼v An = B. This is an equivalence relation. Since ∼v com-
mutes with ,,′,≈G, it is straightforward to see that ≈v does too.
(Note that ≈v and ∼v are relations on acts, while ≡v and >v are rela-
tions on outcomes.)
3.5.3 Commutativity, Compatibility, and Composition of Trade-Off Equiva-
lence
Theorem 12. Assume the outcomes are linearly ordered. Assume that
probabilities are linearly ordered, additive, and homogeneous. Then
≈v is compatible with . (This result needs only comparative proba-
bility, not numerical probability.)
Thus,≈v is compatible and commutes with and, so we can take
their compositions to define relations v and v. (Note that v and
v are relations on acts, while >v and ≥v are relations on outcomes.)
Note that ≈v is not in general compatible with ′. This is trivial if it
is possible for a non-empty set to be equiprobable with the empty set.
In that case, two acts A and B can bear the relation ∼v to each other
when one is better than the other on the empty set, while the other is
better than the first on a non-empty set equiprobable with the empty
set. In that case, the latter bears ′ to the former, so the relations are
not compatible.
Even a restriction of the definition of ∼v to not allow it to directly
deal with the empty set doesn’t solve things, as long as it is possible
for S1 ( S2 with S1 ≡P S2. For instance, consider three bets on the
throw of an infinitely thin dart at a line that is 1 unit long. The state
space can be considered to be the unit interval [0, 1]. Let A0 be the act
that gives value 0 at every point. Let A1 be the act that gives value
+1 for all states in [0, 1/2] and −1 for all states in (1/2, 1] — that is,
we increase the value of the outcome by 1 for all states in the closed
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left half of the interval, and decrease the value of the outcome by 1 for
all states in the open right half of the interval. If [0, 1/2] ≡P (1/2, 1],
then A0 ∼v A1. Let A2 be the act that gives the value +2 for the
state 1/2 and gives the value 0 for all other states. Then A2 ′ A0,
because there is one state in which it is strictly better, and no state in
which it is not at least as good. But if it’s also the case that [0, 1/2) ≡P
[1/2, 1], then A1 ∼v A2, because A2 gives an outcome that is one unit
better in all states in the closed right half of the interval, and one unit
worse in all states in the open left half of the interval. The only way to
block this contradiction with ′ is to say that some sets of the same
numerical probability are nevertheless not equally probable. This may
be reasonable, but one needs to make sure that one doesn’t rule out
too many of these equiprobability relations for ∼v to say anything.
I conjecture that ′ is compatible with ≈v if the probability satis-
fies what I call strong regularity: If S1 ⊆ S2 and S1 ≡P S2, then S1 = S2.
At any rate, there are certainly some state spaces and probability func-
tions that make ≈v compatible with ′. For instance, if the state space
has finitely many states, all of equal (and therefore positive) probabil-
ity, then the argument for compatibility with  will work for ′ as
well.
But this general lack of compatibility between the two is the rea-
son why I prefer to take  as the base relation rather than ′. Further
research to investigate what conditions on the probability, or modifica-
tions of ∼v and ≈v, allow us to use ′ instead is certainly in order.
3.5.4 Expected Utility
Finally, we can put together all the pieces. As Theorem 13 below shows,
under some standard conditions, the relations of dominance, corre-
spondence under a measure-preserving groupoid, and trade-off equiv-
alence are all mutually compatible. Theorem 14 shows that the compo-
sition of trade-off equivalence with dominance includes all decisions
made by standard expected utility theory, assuming a divisibility con-
dition on the state spaces. Thus, the decision theory made by combin-
ing all of the relations described so far is consistent, and gives all the
decisions of expected utility theory, plus substantially more.
Theorem 13. If outcomes and differences are real numbers, and prob-
abilities are numerical and countably additive, and G is any measure-
preserving groupoid, then ≈v is compatible with G.
Say that a probability function is divisible if whenever P(A) > 0,
there is A′ ⊂ A with P(A) > P(A′) > 0.
Theorem 14. If probabilities, values of outcomes, and differences of
outcomes are all real numbers that satisfy the standard relations, and
if probability is divisible, then if A and B are acts on the same space
with finite upper and lower bounds on the utility of their outcomes,
and if the expected utility of A is strictly greater than the expected
utility of B, then A v B.
Thus, v gives a decision theory that extends classical expected
utility theory. However, it also gives us decisions between acts that
classical expected utility theory can’t handle. For instance, if gamble
A is the St. Petersburg game, and gamble B is the St. Petersburg game
together with an independent coin flip that gives $3 if heads and costs
$1 if tails, then B v A (just move $1.50 from the heads states to the
tails states), but both have expected value that is infinite and so can’t
be compared by traditional expected utility theory.
The relation v by itself doesn’t directly allow us to compare acts
on different state spaces, but when it can be combined with ≈G (as
theorem 13 shows it often can) to yield the relation vG, we can further
extend expected utility theory.
For instance, consider act A, which yields the outcome of a St. Pe-
tersburg gamble played for heads, together with the result of an inde-
pendent coin flip that gives $3 if heads and costs $1 if tails. Let act
B yield the outcome of a St. Petersburg gamble played for tails on a
different coin. We can see that A vG B, even though these two acts
can’t be compared by classical expected utility theory (since both have
infinite expectation), or dominance (since they are on different state
spaces), or G (since even with a useful identification of state spaces,
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the additional coin flip in A gives possibilities of either winning or
losing additional money). Thus, vG is a strict extension of all of the
decision theories mentioned so far. There are still acts that it doesn’t
tell us how to compare (for instance, it can’t compare Nover and Há-
jek’s “Pasadena game” to any constant act), but it allows us to make
other decisions involving these acts, and leaves room for further ex-
tension, perhaps if some method like that of Easwaran (2008) can be
combined with the relations described here.
3.5.5 Risk-Weighted Expected Utility
One prominent challenge to classical expected utility theory, raised
prominently by Allais (1953), is the phenomenon of risk aversion. Al-
though Savage famously claimed that Allais’ example is just an exam-
ple of the irrationality of actual human decision-making, many others
have thought that decision theory must be modified to allow for sensi-
tivity to risk.
One such theory is that of Buchak (2013). On this theory, in addi-
tion to a probability function and a utility function, an agent has a
risk-sensitivity function. Instead of each state contributing value to an
act based on its utility times its probability, each state is counted in
proportion to its position in the gamble. That is, states that give rise
to the best possible outcomes may be counted differently from states
that give rise to middling outcomes, which in turn may be counted dif-
ferently from states that give rise to the worst outcomes, even if these
states all have the same probability. On this theory, a risk-averse indi-
vidual may care very strongly about low-probability outcomes if they
are bad, but not if they are neutral or good, while a risk-seeking indi-
vidual may care much more strongly about low-probability outcomes
if they are good, but not if they are neutral or bad.
Thus, if one wants to compare bets involving the flip of a fair coin,
improving the outcomes where one already wins could affect the value
of the bet differently from improving the outcomes where one loses.
A risk-averse individual could prefer the latter, while a risk-seeking
individual could prefer the former.
This theory is obviously in conflict with the relation ∼v that I pro-
posed above. However, in comparing her theory to classical expected
utility theory, Buchak shows that the two theories can be axiomatized
in a way on which the axiom that distinguishes the two corresponds
to this trade-off relation. She shows that by replacing “Trade-Off Con-
sistency” with “Co-Monotone Trade-Off Consistency”, one can turn a
particular set of axioms for the classical theory into a set of axioms for
her theory.
I suspect that a suitable modification of the trade-off equivalence
relation that I discuss should be able to similarly turn my relations
v and vG into relations that bear the same relation to Buchak’s risk-
weighted theory as my relations do to classical expected utility theory.
They would be able to compare acts for which risk-weighted expected
utility theory is either undefined or infinite, in a way that is compatible
with (and extends) the decisions made by that theory in simpler cases.
4. Conclusion
I have shown in section 3 (and in particular in section 3.5.4) that a
decision theory can be built along the lines suggested in section 2 in
such a way that it yields all of the decisions of standard expected util-
ity theory, and more. Additionally, the assumptions that are required
to achieve this result (apart from the divisibility condition on the sets
of states) are all required for standard expected utility theory to even
make sense. When these conditions aren’t satisfied, the defender of
standard expected utility theory must do something totally different
to give any sort of decision theory. However, in such cases, my earlier
results show that some of these relations are still compatible, and so
their composition still gives some requirements on preference, though
they may be weaker than those of expected utility theory. Finally, I’ve
suggested a way to modify the trade-off part of the theory to accom-
modate risk sensitivity while retaining some of the other advantages
of my general approach.
A defender of standard expected utility theory can use my results
to extend her theory to the one I describe in section 3.5.4. She can
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use a standard representation theorem to establish the general numer-
ical conditions on probability and utility, then argue for the norma-
tive force of the relations I describe, and then use the fact that vG
is the smallest relation that extends dominance and is transitive over
the indifference relations to suggest that agents should follow the rec-
ommendations of this theory as well. Thus, even if there is a problem
with isolating differences of value between outcomes separately from
representation theorems, there can still be value to this overall project.
But I think it may be more interesting to suggest a different foun-
dation for the theory. One can take credence and utility to be features
of an agent’s psychology that are not metaphysically dependent on
facts about preference among acts. From this starting point, one can
use Joyce’s arguments to show that credences ought to be probabilis-
tic, and there may be analogous arguments one can use to show that
utilities ought to have the features described in section 3.5.1. One can
then argue that the various relations I describe are normative, and thus
come to the conclusion that rational agents ought to have preferences
that line up with vG. Thus, they ought to obey the prescriptions of
standard expected utility theory (and more). Or, if there are problems
in Joyce’s argument, or reasons to doubt the parallel theory of value
for outcomes, or reasons to allow for risk-sensitivity, then one of the
weaker results can be used. This picture is more in line with the naive
view of decision theory, and it avoids the worries raised by Meacham
and Weisberg (2011). I recommend this final interpretation, though the
formal results don’t require it.9
9. This paper has gone through several versions before reaching this final
form. I would like to thank audiences for helpful comments in 2006 at the
Berkeley-Stanford logic meeting, the Australian National University, the Aus-
tralasian Association of Philosophy, and the Texas Decision Theory Workshop,
as well as in 2009 at the Formal Epistemology Festival in Michigan, and in
2013 at the Workshop in Epistemic Utility Theory at Bristol. There are also
many individuals that have given very helpful feedback along the way, includ-
ing Rachael Briggs, Lara Buchak, Branden Fitelson, Alan Hájek, James Joyce,
Richard Pettigrew, Jake Ross, Sahotra Sarkar, Michael Titelbaum, Matt Weiner
as well as referees for this journal, and probably many other people I have
unintentionally left out.
Appendix: Proofs of Theorems
Theorem 1. If ∼X and ∼Y commute, and both are transitive, then their
composition is transitive too.
Proof. (See the following diagram.) Assume that A1 ∼XY B2 and
B2 ∼XY C3. This means that there is a B1 such that A1 ∼X B1 and
B1 ∼Y B2 and there is a C2 such that B2 ∼X C2 and C2 ∼Y C3. Thus
B1 ∼YX C2. But, by commutativity, this means that B1 ∼XY C2, so there
is a C1 such that B1 ∼X C1 and C1 ∼Y C2. By transitivity of ∼X , we
have A1 ∼X C1, and by transitivity of ∼Y , we have C1 ∼Y C3. Thus, we














C1 Y //C2 Y //C3
Theorem 2. If ∼X and ∼Y are both reflexive, then their composition is
reflexive too.
Proof. Since ∼X and ∼Y are reflexive, we have that A ∼X A and A ∼Y
A. Thus, A ∼XY A.
Theorem 3. If ∼X and ∼Y commute, and both are symmetric, then
their composition is symmetric too.
Proof. Assume that A1 ∼XY B2. This means that there is an A2 such
that A1 ∼X A2 and A2 ∼Y B2. By symmetry of both relations, this
means that B2 ∼Y A2 and A2 ∼X A1. Thus, B2 ∼YX A1, and by com-
mutativity, B2 ∼XY A1.
Theorem 4. If ∼X , ∼Y , and ∼Z are three relations, and ∼XY is the
composition of ∼X with ∼Y , and ∼YZ is the composition of ∼Y with
∼Z, then the composition ∼(XY)Z of ∼XY with ∼Z is the same as the
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composition ∼X(YZ) of ∼X with ∼YZ.
Proof. Based on the definitions, it is straightforward to see that
A ∼(XY)Z D iff there is C with C ∼Z D and A ∼XY C, which means
that there is B with A ∼X B and B ∼Y C. But by definition, this holds
iff B ∼YZ D, and so A ∼X(YZ) D, so the two relations are the same.
Example. A strict ordering and two equivalence relations compatible
with it, that all commute, but which are not mutually compatible:
Consider relations X , ∼Y , and ∼Z, defined as the transitive clo-
sure of the infinite continuation of the following diagram. One can
check that X is a strict ordering, ∼Y and ∼Z are equivalence re-
lations, X is compatible with each of the others individually, and
any two of them commute, but they are not mutually compatible. (Ev-




















































. X //. X //.
Theorem 5. If G is any groupoid on the set of state spaces for all acts,
then ≈G commutes with ,,≈,′.
Proof. I will show this for , but the other three proofs are exactly
parallel. If A1  A2 and A2 ≈G B2, then we must have SA1 = SA2 , so
we can call this set SA. Additionally, there is some g in G such that for
all s in SA, A2(s) = B2(g(s)).
Let SB be the set of states on which B2 is defined. Then g−1 is
also in G, and so we can define, for s in SB, B1(s) = A1(g−1(s)), and
see that A1 ≈G B1. Since g−1(g(s)) = s, for all s in SA, we can see
that B2(s) = A2(g−1(s)). Since A1  A2, we see that for all s in SB,
A1(g−1(s)) >v A2(g−1(s)). But this is just what it means to say that
B1  B2. Thus, by assuming the existence of A2 with A1  A2 ≈G B2,
we have shown the existence of B1 such that A1 ≈G B1  A2.
The converse direction, and the versions replacing  with ,≈,′
all work exactly the same way.
Theorem 6. If the probability is regular, and G is measure-preserving,
then ≈G is compatible with ′ (and therefore with ).
Proof. Assume that ′ is incompatible with ≈G. This means there are
acts A and B with A ′ B and B ≈G A. B ≈G A means that there
is a measure-preserving permutation g with B(s) = A(g(s)) for all s.
A ′ B means that there is some s with A(s) >v A(g(s)), and that for
every s, A(s) ≥v A(g(s)).
Let s0 be some state with A(s0) >v A(g(s0)), and let S0 be the set
of all s′ such that A(s′) ≥v A(s0) and A(g(s′)) <v A(s0). Since A and
g are measurable, S0 is too.
By the definitions of S0 and g, it is clear that S0 is disjoint from
g[S0], g[g[S0]], etc., since A(s) ≥v A(s0) for any s in S0, and A(s) <v
A(s0) for any s in any of the latter sets. Since g is a correspondence, an
equal number of applications of g to both sides will preserve disjoint-
ness. Thus, all of these sets are disjoint. Since g is measure-preserving,
these are all measurable and equiprobable. But since there are infinitely
many of them, they must be null. This contradicts the fact that the prob-
ability is regular, so ′ must be compatible with ≈G.
Theorem 7. If O is separable, then there is a function R from O to the
real numbers, such that whenever o1 <v o2, it is the case that R(o1) <
R(o2).
Proof. Using the Axiom of Choice, we can extend <v to a linear order-
ing <′v on O. The rationals contain an isomorphic copy of every count-
able linearly ordered set, so we can use the isomorphic copy of D to
define R on the members of D, in such a way that whenever d1 <′v d2,
we have R(d1) < R(d2), where both numbers are rational. (This also
means that whenever d1 <v d2, we have R(d1) < R(d2), though the
converse doesn’t necessarily hold.)
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Then for any o ∈ O, we can consider the sets D<o and D>o which
consist of all members of D that are (respectively) below or above o in
<′v. These sets are both non-empty, and by transitivity, every member
of R[D<o] is less than every member of R[D>o]. Thus, we can assign
R(o) to be any real number in this gap. Because D is dense, there can
be no contradiction between these assignments, so they can all be made
independently. The resulting function R has the desired property.
Theorem 8. If the probability is countably partitive, and the outcome
space is separable, and G is measure-preserving, then≈G is compatible
with .
Proof. Let R be a function given by Theorem 7.
Now assume that there is some A and some g such that for all
s, A(s) >v A(g(s)). We can define a function f on states such that
f (s) = R(A(s))− R(A(g(s))). This function is measurable. (The set of
s with f (s) > e is the union of the sets of s such that A(s) >v R−1(x)
and A(g(s)) < R−1(x− e) [which is always measurable, since A and g
are measurable] where x ranges over all rationals. This is a countable
union of measurable sets.)
The whole space is then the countable union of the sets with
f (s) > e where e is any positive rational number. Thus, by countable
partitivity, at least one of these sets is non-null. Let S be this set.
Now consider Sk = {s ∈ S|R( f (s)) < ke}, where k is any inte-
ger. Let Tk = Sk − Sk−1. Then Tk, g[Tk], g[g[Tk]], . . . are disjoint sets
(Tk is disjoint from the following sets because they are all contained
within Sk−1 by definition of S, and each other set is disjoint from all
sets following it because g is a permutation) that are all equally prob-
able (because g is measure-preserving). Thus, Tk must be null. But S
is non-null, and it is the union of the countably many Tk, which is a
contradiction.
Therefore, the assumption that there were such an A and g must be
false, so we see that  and ≈G are compatible.
Theorem 9. If S1 ≡P S2 and the comparative probability relation is
homogeneous, then there is a measure-preserving correspondence g
with g[S1] = S2.
Proof sketch:. The definition of homogeneity means that there is a
measure-preserving correspondence g1 with g1[S1] ⊆ S2 and a
measure-preserving correspondence g2 with g2[S2] ⊆ S1. By follow-
ing the standard proof of the Schröder-Bernstein theorem in set theory,
one can use these two measure-preserving correspondences to create
g.
Theorem 10. If S1 and S2 are in the same state space, and the compar-
ative probability relation is homogeneous and additive, then there is
a measure-preserving permutation h such that h[S1] = S2, h[S2] = S1,
and h is the identity on all states outside of S1 ∪ S2.
Proof. Let S′1 = S1 \ S2 and S′2 = S2 \ S1 be the sets of members of
one set but not the other. By additivity, S′1 ≡P S′2. Let g be a measure-
preserving permutation with g[S1] = S2 as given by Theorem 9. Then
define h(s) = g(s) if s ∈ S′1, h(s) = g−1(s) if s ∈ S′2, and h(s) = s
otherwise. This function satisfies the stated conditions.
Theorem 11. Let P be a homogeneous probability function. Let A1 and
A2 be any discrete acts such that for every o, (A1(s) = o) ≡P (A2(s) =
o). Then there is a measure-preserving correspondence g such that for
all s, A1(s) = A2(g(s)).
Proof. Because A1 and A2 are discrete, there are only countably many
o that are the outcome of either act on any state. Number these
as o1, o2, . . . . By homogeneity, there is a correspondence g0 between
SA1 and SA2 . By induction, I will construct a sequence of measure-
preserving correspondences gn such that gn[A1(s) = oi] = (A2(s) = oi)
for any i ≤ n. For each state s, there is some i such that A1(s) = oi, and
I will then define g(s) = gi(s). It will be straightforward to see that g
is the desired correspondence.
Now assume that gn has already been constructed. We can construct
gn+1 by noting that (gn[A1(s) = on+1]) ≡P (A2(s) = on+1). Thus, by
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Theorem 10, there is a measure-preserving permutation of SA2 that in-
terchanges these two sets and leaves everything else fixed. Composing
this permutation with gn gives gn+1.
Theorem 12. Assume the outcomes are linearly ordered. Assume that
probabilities are linearly ordered, additive, and homogeneous. Then
≈v is compatible with . (This result needs only comparative proba-
bility, not numerical probability.)
Proof. I will prove a lemma showing that if A0 ∼v A1 ∼v
A2 . . . An−1 ∼v An, then there exists a sequence that starts and ends
with the same A0 and An, which is “monotonic”, in the sense that for
each state s, either A0(s) ≤v A1(s) ≤v · · · ≤v An−1(s) ≤v An(s) or
A0(s) ≥v A1(s) ≥v · · · ≥v An−1(s) ≥v An(s).
Given this lemma, the proof can then be completed as follows: as-
sume there are some A0 and An such that A0  An and A0 ≈v An.
Applying the lemma, we can find a sequence A0 ∼v A1 ∼v · · · ∼v
An−1 ∼v An that is monotonic in the sense just mentioned. Let Si
be the set of states s in which Ai(s) >v Ai+1(s). By monotonicity,
and since A0  An, the union of the Si must be the whole state
space. By finite additivity, there must be some i such that Si is strictly
more probable than the empty set. But then the set of states for which
Ai(s) <v Ai+1(s) must also be strictly more probable than the empty
set. Thus, by monotonicity of the sequence, these states must be ones
for which A0(s) <v An(s), which contradicts the claim that A0  An.
Thus, there can be no A0  An with A0 ≈v An, as required.
Now it just remains to prove the lemma. I will prove it for the case
when the sequence has just two steps, but the argument should gen-
eralize to any number of steps. The idea is to consider T(A0, A1) =
(S1+, S1−, d1) and T(A1, A2) = (S2+, S2−, d2). The goal will be to re-
place these two trade-offs with four trade-offs such that the states in
which each trade-off increases the values of outcomes is completely
disjoint from the sets of states in which each trade-off decreases the
values of outcomes. The following diagram may be helpful. The red
and purple areas on the left represent S1+ and d1, and the ones on
the right represent S1− and d1; the blue and purple areas on the right
represent S2+ and d2, and the ones on the left represent S2− and d2.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that d1 >d d2 >d 0d (d1 is
the height of the red regions, and d2 is the height of the blue regions),
and that S1+ ∩ S2− >P S1− ∩ S2+ (these are respectively the widths of
the right and left purple regions). Then we can define the four trade-
offs shown in the diagram, so that no state has its outcome increased
by one trade-off and decreased by another.
The set-theoretic definitions (which guarantee that these are in fact
trade-offs of the relevant sort that add up to the same result as the
initial two trade-offs) are as follows: the first trade-off (indicated by
the two regions with “1” on the diagram) is (S∗, S2+ ∩ S1−, d1 − d2),
where S1+ ∩ S2− ⊂ S∗ ⊂ S1+ and S∗ ≡P S2+ ∩ S1−. The second trade-
off (indicated by the two regions with “2” on the diagram) is (S∗ \
S2−, S∗, d2), where S∗ ⊂ S2− \ S1+ and S∗ ≡P S∗ \ S2−. The third trade-
off (indicated by the two regions with “3” on the diagram) is (S2+ \
S1−, S2− \ (S1+ ∪ S∗), d2). The fourth tradeoff (indicated by the two
regions with “4” on the diagram) is (S1+ \ S∗, S1− \ S2+, d1).
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This proves the lemma for the case of two consecutive trade-offs,
and the construction should generalize to any finite number of consec-
utive trade-offs, which completes the proof of the theorem.
Theorem 13. If outcomes and differences are real numbers, and prob-
abilities are numerical and countably additive, and G is any measure-
preserving groupoid, then ≈v is compatible with G.
Proof. As before, for any act A, we can define CDFA(x) = P(A(s) ≤ x)
for any real-number outcome x. Now we can define CDF−(A, B) =∫
(CDFB(x) − CDFA(x))dx, where the integral is taken over all real
numbers. By Theorem 11, we can see that if A G B, then A stochas-
tically dominates B, so that for all x, CDFA(x) < CDFB(x). Then
CDF−(A, B) is positive.
To complete the proof, I will show that if A ≈v B, then
CDF−(A, B) = 0. To prove this, it will suffice to prove that if A ∼v
B, then CDF−(A, B) = 0, and that CDF−(A, B) + CDF−(B, C) =
CDF−(A, C). The second part holds because of linearity of subtraction,
addition, and integration. So it just remains to show that if A ∼v B,
then CDF−(A, B) = 0.
To do this, I will show that if T(A, B) = (S,∅, k) (meaning that
A(s) − B(s) = k whenever s ∈ S and A(s) = B(s) otherwise), then
CDF−(A, B) = kP(S). Then the fact that A ∼v B iff there is C with
T(A, C) = (S1,∅, k) and T(C, B) = (S2,∅,−k) with P(S1) = P(S2)
completes the proof.
So assume that T(A, B) = (S,∅, k). Then CDFB(x) − CDFA(x) =
P(S ∩ (x − k < A(s) ≤ x)), because the states where B(s) > x are
exactly the states in S with A(s) > x− k. Integrating this over all x, we
should get kP(S). (This is because, for any s ∈ S, it will show up in
CDF−(A, B) for all x between A(s) and B(s).)
Theorem 14. If probabilities, values of outcomes, and differences of
outcomes are all real numbers that satisfy the standard relations, and
if probability is divisible, then if A and B are acts on the same space
with finite upper and lower bounds on the utility of their outcomes,
and if the expected utility of A is strictly greater than the expected
utility of B, then A v B.
Proof. Say that an act is simple iff it has only finitely many distinct out-
comes. It is a standard result that for any act whose outcomes have
a finite upper and lower bound, there are simple acts dominating it
whose expected utilities are arbitrarily close to its expected utility, and
there are simple acts it dominates whose expected utilities are arbitrar-
ily close to its expected utility. These simple acts can also be arranged
to have outcomes with rational utility and to have rational probability
of achieving each outcome (because of divisibility).
Thus, we can find simple acts A′ and B′ with A  A′ and B′  B,
with A′ and B′ both simple and rational, and with the expected utility
of A′ greater than that of B′. But any simple and rational act is trade-
off equivalent to the act whose outcome in every state is equal to the
expected utility of that act. (This can be seen by breaking the space
of states into subsets whose probabilities are all equal to the greatest
common divisor of the probabilities of the outcomes of the simple and
rational act, and shifting utility around in units equal to the greatest
common divisor of the utilities of the outcomes of the act and the
expected utility of the act.)
Thus, A′ is trade-off equivalent to an act that dominates one that
is trade-off equivalent to B′, so A and B are related by a sequence of
dominance and trade-off-equivalence relations, and so, by commuta-
tivity of these relations, we must have A v B.
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